Abstract. We present a new SAT-based safety model checking framework, named approximate reachability (AR). AR is based on standard reachability analysis, but instead of maintaining a sequence of reachable state sets, AR maintains two sequences of (over-and under-) approximate reachable state sets, checking safety and unsafety concurrently. AR is inspired by IC3/PDR, but it uses different refinement strategies. Specifically, AR uses standard Boolean-reasoning algorithms: one to find a satisfying cube of a satisfiable Boolean formula, and one to provide a minimal unsatisfiable core of an unsatisfiable Boolean formula. We applied AR to an amount of 548 hardware model-checking benchmarks, and compared its performance with IC3/PDR, a state-of-the-art SATbased model-checking technique. Our experimental results show that AR is able to solve 33 benchmarks that cannot be solved by IC3/PDR. We conclude that AR should be considered as a valuable member of any algorithmic portfolio for safety model checking.
Introduction
Model checking is a fundamental methodology in formal verification and is an ongoing subject of both research and practice [9, 2] . Given a system model M and a property P , model checking answers the question whether P holds for M . When P is a linear-time property, this means that we check that all behaviors of M satisfy P , otherwise a violating behavior is returned as a counterexample. The essential challenge in model checking is the exponential scaling of the model's state space, the so-called "state-explosion problem" [10] .
Early approaches to model checking [11, 22] were based on an explicit search of the model's transition graph, where nodes represent states, and edges represent system transitions. Such explicit-state techniques typically do not scale well beyond models with a few million states [16] . A major break through, in the early 1990s, was the introduction of symbolic techniques, which replaced explicit search by Boolean-reasoning techniques. The development of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [6] , led to the development of BDD-based symbolic model checking, which enabled the verification of systems with 10 20 states [8] . Yet BDD-based techniques rarely scale to models with more than 1,000 Boolean state variables, which limits their applicability to the verification of industrial systems [26] .
In the late 1990s, SAT solving emerged as a highly effective Boolean-reasoning technique [18] . The first application of SAT solving to model checking was in the context of bounded model checking (BMC), in which the search over model behavior is subject to a depth bound [3] . This approach, where model checking is reduced to a sequence of SAT-solving calls, one for each depth bound, has been shown to be highly effective in practice [12] . Yet BMC is incomplete, as it can only reveal the presence of counterexample behavior, but not prove their absence, which led to a quest to develop SAT-based complete model-checking techniques. This is still a very much active area, as no single approach has proven to be superior to all other approaches, cf. [25] . While some approaches have tried to find ways to extend BMC to make it complete, e.g., [23] , others have tried to follow the approach of BDD-based symbolic model checking. This is the approach we follow here.
There are two ideas in BDD-based model checking [8] : (1) a set of states can be represented by a Boolean formula (a BDD is a special case), (2) a key operation in searching the state space is the image/pre-image operation, in which we compute symbolically the set of successor/predecessor states of a given set S of states. Much of the research in BDD-based symbolic model checking has focused on efficient implementation of the image operation, cf. [7] . One direction of research on SAT-based complete model-checking techniques has been on a SAT-based implementation of the image operation. While standard SAT solving returns a single satisfying assignment when the formula under test is satisfiable, there is a variant, called All-SAT, that returns a representation of all satisfying assignments, cf. [27] .
Several works in the early 2000s utilized All-SAT solving to implement the image operation [15, 17, 21] . The idea is to enumerate all solutions of the formula F (V )∧T (V, V ), where F represents symbolically a set of states over variable set V and T (V, V ) represents symbolically the model transition relation. By projecting the set of satisfying assignments on the variable set V , which represents successor state variables, we obtained a representation of the image of F . (The pre-image can be computed analogously.)
All-SAT-based symbolic model checking did not, however, prove to provide a highly scalable approach. Two other SAT-based approaches emerged in the following years. Interpolation-based model checking [20] combines the use of Craig Interpolation as an abstraction technique with the use of BMC as a search technique. IC3/PDR starts with an over-approximation, and is gradually refined to be more and more precise [4, 13] . Both approaches have proven to be highly scalable, and are today parts of the algorithmic portfolio of modern symbolic model checkers, such as ABC [5] .
In this paper, we present a new SAT-based model checking framework, named Approximate Reachability (AR), which is motivated both by classical symbolic reachability analysis and by IC3/PDR as an abstraction-refinement technique. While standard reachability analysis maintains a sequence of reachable state sets, AR maintains two sequences of (over-and under-) approximate reachable state sets, checking safety and unsafety concurrently. The under-approximate se-quence is extended by finding partial satisfying assignments for certain formulas, where we use techniques, originally developed in the context of All-SAT solving [27] . While IC3/PDR refines the over-approximate sequence by adding Minimal Inductive Clauses (MIC), AR refines the over-approximate sequence by adding Minimal Unsat Subsets (MUS) of unsatisfiable formulas. Thus, while IC3/PDR uses a specialized algorithmic building block (MIC), AR relies on the standard SAT-solving algorithms of partial-assignment and MUS extraction. In addition, AR leverages the symmetry of safety model checking, and performs reachability analysis both forward and backward in parallel, terminating when the first of the two parallel threads finds an answer.
To evaluate the performance of AR, we benchmarked it with 548 problem instances from 2015 Hardware Model-Checking Competition, and compared the results with IC3/PDR. The results show that while the performance of AR does not dominate the performance of IC3/PDR, we are able to solve 33 instances that IC3/PDR is not able to solve. It is well known that there is no "best" algorithm in model checking area; different algorithms perform differently on different problem instances [1] , and a state-of-the-art tool must implement a portfolio of different algorithms, cf. [5] . Our empirical results support the conclusion that AR is an important contribution to the algorithmic portfolio of symbolic model checking.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminaries, while Section 3 describes the framework of AR. Section 4 describes the missing details in the framework. Section 5 introduces experimental results, and finally Section 6 discusses and concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Boolean Transition System and Safety Verification
A Boolean transition system Sys is a tuple (V, I, T ), where V is a set of Boolean variables, and every state s of the system is in 2 V , the set of truth assignments to V . I is a Boolean formula representing the set of initial states. Let V be the set of primed variables (a new copy) corresponding to the variables of V , then T is a Boolean formula over V ∪ V , denoting the transition relation of the system. Formally, for two states s 1 , s 2 ∈ 2 V , s 2 is a successor state of s 1 , denoted as ( 
We use the notation s 1 → s 2 → . . . → s k to denote a path from s 1 to s k . We say that a state t is reachable from a state s, or that s reaches t, if there is a path from s to t. Moreover, we say t is reachable from s in i steps (resp., within i steps) if there is a path from s to t of length i (resp., of length at most i).
Let X ⊆ 2 V be a set of states in Sys, we define R(X) = {s |(s, s ) ∈ T where s ∈ X}, i.e., R(X) is the set of successors of states in X. Conversely, we define R −1 (X) = {s|(s, s ) ∈ T where s ∈ X}, i.e., R −1 (X) is the set of predecessors of states in X.
Given a Boolean transition system Sys = (V, I, T ) and a safety property P , which is a Boolean formula over V , the system is called safe if P holds in all reachable states of Sys, otherwise it is called unsafe. The safety checking asks whether Sys is safe. For unsafe systems, we want to find a path from an initial state to some state s that violates P , i.e., s ∈ ¬P . We call such state reachable to ¬P a bad state, and the path from I to ¬P a counterexample.
Reachability Analysis
In symbolic model checking (SMC), safety checking is performed via symbolic reachability analysis. From the set I of initial states, We compute the set of reachable states by computing R i (I) for increasing values of i. We can compute the set of states that can reach states in ¬P , by computing (R −1 ) i (¬P ) for increasing values of i. The first approach is called forward search, while the second one is called backward search. The formal definition of these two approaches are shown in the table below.
Forward
Backward Basic:
For forward search, the state set F i is the set of states that are reachable from I in i steps. This set is computed by iteratively applying R. To find a counterexample, forward search checks at every step whether one of the bad states has been reached, i.e., whether F i ∩ ¬P = ∅. If a counterexample is not found, the search will terminate when F i+1 ⊆ 0≤j≤i F j . For backward search, the set B i is the set of states that can reach ¬P in i steps. The workflow of backward search is analogous to that of forward search. Note that forward checking of Sys = (V, I, T ) with respect to P is equivalent to backward checking of Sys −1 = (V, ¬P, T −1 ) with respect to ¬I, where T −1 is simply T , with primed and unprimed variables exchanged.
Notation
Each variable a ∈ V is called an atom. A literal l is an atom a or a negated atom ¬a. A conjunction of a set of literals, i.e.,
Obviously, the negation of a cube is a clause, and vice versa. Let C be a set of cubes (resp., clauses), we define the Boolean formula f (C) = c∈C c (resp., f (C) = c∈C c). For simplicity, we use C to represent f (C) when it appears in a Boolean formula; for example, the formulas ϕ ∧ C and ϕ ∨ C, abbreviate ϕ ∧ f (C) and ϕ ∨ (f (C)).
A cube (/clause) c can be treated as a set of literals, a Boolean formula, or a set of states, depending on the context it is used. If c appears in a Boolean formula, for example, c ⇒ ϕ, it is treated as a Boolean formula. If we say a set c 1 is a subset of c 2 , then we treat c 1 and c 2 as literal sets. If we say a state st is in c, then we treat c as a set of states. Each state in the system is essentially a cube, so it is considered in the same way.
We use s(x)/s (x ) to denote the current/primed version of the state s. Similarly, we use ϕ(x)/ϕ (x ) to denote the current/primed version of a Boolean formula ϕ. For the transition formula T , we use the notation T (x, x ) to highlight that it contains both current and primed variables. Consider a Boolean formula ϕ whose alphabet is V and in the conjunctive normal form (CNF). If ϕ is satisfiable, there is a full assignment A ∈ 2 V ∪V such that A |= ϕ. Moreover, there is a partial assignment A p ⊆ A such that for every full assignment A ⊇ A p it holds that A |= ϕ. In the following, we use the notation pa(ϕ) to represent a partial assignment of ϕ, and use pa(ϕ)| x to represent the subset of pa(ϕ) achieved by projecting variables only to V . On the other hand, if ϕ is unsatisfiable, there is a minimal unsat subset (MUS) C ⊆ ϕ (here ϕ is treated as a set of clauses) such that C is unsatisfiable and every C ⊂ C is satisfiable.
In the following, we use the notation mus(ϕ) to represent such a MUS of ϕ, and use mus(ϕ)| c to represent the subset of mus(ϕ) achieved by projecting clauses only to c . Since c is a cube, mus(ϕ)| c is also a cube.
The Framework of Approximate Reachability
In this section, we present a variant of standard reachability checking, in which the set of maintained states are allowed to be approximate. The new approach is named Approximate Reachability, which is abbreviated as AR. The same as the standard reachability analysis, AR also enables both forward and backward search. In the following, we introduce the forward approach in detail, and the backward approach can be derived symmetrically to save paper space.
Approximate State Sequences
In standard forward search, described in Section 2, each F i is a set of states that are reachable from I in i steps. To compute elements in F i+1 , previous SAT-based symbolic-model-checking approaches consider the formula ϕ = F i (x) ∧ T (x, x ), and use partial-assignment techniques to obtain all states in F i+1 from ϕ (by projecting to the prime part of the assignments). Since the set of reachable states are computed accurately, maintaining a sequence of sets of reachable states from I enables to check both safety and unsafety. However in Forward AR, two sequences of sets of reachable states are necessary to maintain: 1). (F 0 , F 1 , . . .) is a sequence of over-approximate state sets, which are supersets of reachable states from I. 2) (B 0 , B 1 , . . .) is a sequence of under-approximate state sets, which are subsets of reachable states to ¬P . Under the approximation, the first sequence is only sufficient to check safety, and the second one is then required to check unsafety. The two state sequences are formally defined as follows. Definition 1. For a Boolean system Sys and the safety property P , the overapproximate state sequences (F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F i )(i ≥ 0), which is abbreviated as Fsequence, and the under-approximate state sequence (B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B k )(k ≥ 0), which is abbreviated as B-sequence, are finite sequences of state sets such that:
We also define the notation S(F ) = 0≤j≤i F j is the set of states in the F -sequence, and S(B) = 0≤j≤k B j is the set of states in the B-sequence.
Note that the F -and B-sequence are not required to have the same length. Intuitively, each F i+1 is an over-approximate set of states that are reachable from F i in one step, and B i+1 is an under-approximate set of states that are reachable to B i . As we mentioned in Section 2, we overload notation and consider F i to represent (1) a set of states, (2) a set of clauses and (3) a Boolean formula in CNF. Analogously, we consider B i to be (1) a set of states, (2) a set of cubes and (3) a Boolean formula in DNF.
The following theorem shows that, the safety checking is preserved even if
Theorem 2 (Safety Checking). A system Sys is safe for P iff there is i ≥ 0 and an
. So S contains all reachable states from I. Also we know P ⊇ F i (0 ≤ i ≤ k), so P ⊇ S holds. That means S ∩ ¬P is empty, and thus all reachable states from I, which are included in S, are not in ¬P . So the system Sys is safe for P .
(⇒) Assume the system Sys is safe for P , then all reachable states from I are in P . Let S ⊆ P be the set of reachable states from I. Now let F 0 = I, F 1 = S and F 2 = S, and according to Definition 1 we know that δ = (
Theorem 2 is not efficient for unsafety checking, as F i+1 ⊆ 0≤j≤i F j has to prove false for every i ≥ 0. On the other hand, the unsafety checking condition ∃i · F i ∩ ¬P = ∅ in the standard forward reachability is not correct when F i becomes over-approximate. Our solution is to benefit from the information stored in the B-sequence.
Theorem 3 (Unsafety Checking). For a system Sys and the safety property P , Sys is unsafe for P iff there is i ≥ 0 and a B-sequence (B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B i ) such that I ∩ B i = ∅.
Proof. (⇐) If I ∩ B i = ∅ and according to Definition 1, we can find a path ρ = s 0 → s 1 → . . . s i in Sys such that s 0 ∈ I ∩ B i and s j ∈ B i−j for 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Hence we have that s i ∈ B 0 = ¬P , which means ρ is a counterexample. So Sys is unsafe for P .
(⇒) If Sys is unsafe for P , there is a path ρ from I to ¬P . Let the length of ρ be n + 1, and state j(0 ≤ j ≤ n) on the path is labeled as ρ[j]. Now we construct the B-sequence (B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B i ) in the following way: Let i = n and
Besides, since AR maintains two different sequences, exploring the relationship between them can help to establish the framework. The following property shows that, the states stored in F -and B-sequences are unreachable when the system Sys is safe for the property P .
Property 4. For a system Sys and the safety property P , Sys is safe for P iff there is an F -sequence such that S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ for every B-sequence.
Proof. (⇒) Theorem 2 shows if Sys is safe for P there is an F -sequence and n ≥ 0 such that F n+1 ⊆ 0≤j≤n F j . Let S = 0≤j≤n F j . We have proven that R(S) ⊆ S, i.e. S is the upper bound of S(F ). So S(F ) = 0≤j≤i F j = S for all i ≥ n. On the other hand, since we consider arbitrary B-sequence, we set S(B) to its upper bound: the set of all reachable states to ¬P . In this situation,
. So s is reachable to ¬P . Assume s is reachable to t ∈ ¬P and from the definition of S(F ) we know t ∈ S(F ) too. However, this is a contradiction, because S(F ) ∩ ¬P is empty based on the constraint S(F ) ⊆ P . So S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ is true. (⇐) Since both S(F ) and S(B) have an upper bound, we can set them to their upper bounds. That is, set S(F ) to contain all reachable states from I, and S(B) to contain all reachable states to ¬P . Because R −1 (S(B)) has the same upper bound with S(B), S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ indicates that I is not reachable to ¬P . So Sys is safe for P . Property 4 suggests a direction that how we can refine the F -sequence and update the B-sequence. That is to try to make the states in these two sequences unreachable. More details are shown in the next section.
We have established the Forward AR framework, and presented the theoretical guarantee for both safety and unsafety checking. One may note that by simply switching the F -sequence to be under-approximate and the B-sequence to be over-approximate, we can achieve the backward AR. In the following, we introduce a checking framework based on the two approximate state sequences.
The Framework
Unlike standard forward search, which computes all states in F i+1 from the single formula F i (x) ∧ T (x, x ), Forward AR computes elements of F i+1 from different SAT calls with different inputs. Each SAT call gets as input a formula of the form
, where the cube c is in some B j and c is its primed version. If the formula is satisfiable, we are able to find a new state which is in B j+1 ; otherwise we prove that c ∩ R(F i ) = ∅, which indicates F i+1 can be refined by adding the clause ¬c. The following lemma shows the main idea of computing new reachable states to ¬P and new clauses to refine F i .
Lemma 5. Let (F 0 , F 1 , . . .) be an F -sequence, (B 0 , B 1 , . . .) be a B- 
Proof. 1. Since ϕ is satisfiable, there exists a partial assignment A p , which is a set of literals, of ϕ. Now by projecting A p to the part only contains current variables, i.e. A p | x , we set c 2 = A p | x . Let t ∈ c 2 and s ∈ c 1 are two states. From the definition of partial assignment, we know that t(x) ∪ s (x ) is a full assignment of ϕ. So t is a predecessor of s. Moreover, since F i consists of only current variables, t(x) ∪ s (x ) |= F i (x) implies t |= F i . So t ∈ F i is true. Before updating B j+1 , we know that B j+1 ⊆ R −1 (B j ). And since
is true. From Definition 1, the sequence is still a B-sequence. 2. From the definition R(F i ) = {s|(t, s) ∈ T and t ∈ F i }, we know for every state s ∈ R(F i ) there is a state t ∈ F i such that t(x)∪s (x ) |= F i (x)∧T (x, x ). If there is a state s ∈ c 1 such that s ∈ R(F i ), we know that there is t ∈ F i such that t(x) ∪ s (x ) is an assignment of ϕ, making ϕ satisfiable. But this is a contradiction. So c 1 ∩R(F i ) = ∅. Moreover, since ϕ is unsatisfiable, there is a cube c 2 such that c 1 ⇒ c 2 and
So c 2 ∩ R(F i ) = ∅ is also true, which implies that ¬c 2 ⊇ R(F i ), i.e. states represented by ¬c 2 includes all those in R(F i ). So F i+1 ∪ {¬c 2 } ⊇ R(F i ) is true, which means F i+1 is still over-approximate. For every other F k (1 ≤ (k = i + 1)), they remains over-approximate. As a result, we prove that the sequence is still an F -sequence.
In the lemma above, Item 1 suggests to add a set of states rather than a single one to the B-sequence, and similarly Item 2 suggests to refine the F -sequence by blocking a set of states rather than a single one. In both situations, it will speed up the computation. These two kinds of heuristics can be achieved by partial-assignment and MUS techniques. That is, we can set c 2 = pa(ϕ)| x in Item 1, and c 2 = mus(ϕ)| c1 in Item 2. Now, we provide a general framework of AR, which is shown in Table 1 . Missing details of the framework will be specified in the next section. 
vi. If ϕ is satisfiable, let c2 = pa(ϕ)|x then assert c2 ⊆ R −1 (S(B)) and set B k+2 := B k+2 ∪ {c2} if B k+2 exists, otherwise set B k+2 := {c2}; vii. If ϕ is unsatisfiable, let c2 = mus(ϕ)| c 1 then assert ¬c2 ⊇ Fj and set
The motivation of the computation are simply twofold: 1) Enlarge the lengths of the F -and B-sequences step by step (controlled by i in the framework); 2) For each i, update both sequences until either the unsafety is detected (Step 3(b) 
) is a necessary condition to prove safety (in Step 3c). In Step 3(b)i, we choose the minimal index because AR aims to find a counterexample, if exists, as soon as possible. The F -and B-sequence are not extended synchronously: In each i, the F -sequence is extended only once (in Step 3a), while the B-sequence is extended more than once (in Step 3(b)iv and 3(b)vi). In Step 3c, the constraint F j ⊆ 0≤m≤j−1 F m can be checked by SAT solvers with the input formula (F j ∧ 0≤m≤j−1 ¬F m ). The constraint holds iff the formula is unsatisfiable. S(F ) and S(B) are updated by default when the F -and B-sequence are updated. Now we first show that the assertions in the framework are always true, and then prove the while loop in Step 3b can always terminate. Proof. We first prove the assertion in Step 3(b)vi is true. From Step 3(b)i we know that
) is true. For the assertion in Step 3(b)vii, first from Step 3(b)iii we know that c 1 ∩ F j = ∅, so (c 2 ⊇ c 1 ) ∩ F j = ∅ is also true. Thus the assertion ¬c 2 ⊇ F j is true.
Informally speaking, Lemma 6 guarantees that adding c 2 to B k+1 increases strictly the states in R −1 (S(B)) (recall that each B i is in DNF), while adding ¬c 2 to F j decreases strictly the states in F j (F j is in CNF). The assertions help to prove the termination of Step 3b.
Theorem 7.
Step 3b in the framework can always terminate.
Proof. Assume that S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ never holds, and j > 0 in the framework is always true. So there is always a formula ϕ = F j−1 (x) ∧ T (x, x ) ∧ c 1 (x ) such that the F -or B-sequence can be updated (see Step 3(b)vi and 3(b)vii). Moreover, Lemma 6 guarantees that the size of each F i decreases strictly while the size of R −1 (S(B)) increases strictly. However, since the sizes of F i s and R −1 (S(B)) are bounded, they cannot be updated forever. As a result, either j = 0 must be finally true, or S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ finally holds.
The correctness and termination of the framework are guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Given a system Sys and the safety property P , the framework will finally return, and return correctly.
Proof. First of all, if the framework returns, Lemma 5 guarantees the F -and Bsequences are preserved under the framework. Hence, the correctness is guaranteed by Theorem 3 and Theorem 2.
Now we prove the framework will finally return. First Theorem 7 guarantees the while loop in the framework can always terminate, with unsafe or S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ is true. As a result, the loop body on each i can finally terminate. Now we prove the loop on i can also terminate. If Sys is unsafe for P with a counterexample of length of greater than one, the framework will return finally according to Item 3(b)ii. It is because the size of S(B) is bounded, so the size of R −1 (S(B)) is also bounded. Moreover, Lemma 6 guarantees the size of R −1 (S(B)) keeps growing in each i, thus R −1 (S(B)) will finally contain all reachable states to ¬P for some i ≥ 0, which will include an initial state in I = F 0 . On the other hand, if Sys is safe for P , since S(F ) is also bounded, and Lemma 6 guarantees the size of each F j keeps decreasing, so S(F ) will finally contain only the set of reachable states from I for some i. At that time, our framework will return according to Item 3c based on Theorem 2.
Although
Step 3b is crucial to the framework, we describe it in a high-level abstract way to show the general idea, and the algorithm needs to be designed by users. However, it is clear to see the main difference between Forward AR and IC3/PDR based on the framework. In Step 3(b)vi, AR keeps the new bad state in the B-sequence but does not try to remove them in the F -sequence. AR only refines the F -sequence in Step 3(b)vii when ϕ is unsatisfiable. On the other hand, IC3/PDR tries to immediately remove the computed bad state by invoking an additional SAT query:
. If this formula is unsatisfiable, c 2 can be safely removed from F j−1 . Briefly, AR and IC3/PDR use different refinement strategies on the F -sequence. More details are discussed in the following.
Implementation
In this section, we talk about the implementation of AR in our hardware model checker ARcheck. We implement both Forward and Backward AR in ARcheck,
Algorithm 1 Implementation of explore in ARcheck
Require: F -sequence: (F0, F1, . . . , Fm (m ≥ 0)) ; B-sequence: (B0, B1, . . . , Bn (n ≥ 0)); Ensure: A counterexample is returned or assert S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅; 1: for n ≥ i ≥ 0 do 2:
Let c = pa(ϕ)|x, and update Bi+1 = Bi+1 ∪ {c}; 4:
if dfscheck (c, m − 1, n + 1) returns unsafe with a counterexample then 5:
return unsafe with a counterexample 6: end if 7:
end while 8: end for 9: Let updated B-sequence be (B0, B1, . . . , B n (n ≥ n ≥ 0)); 10:
but we introduce only the implementation of Forward AR here to save paper space. (Actually backward AR is implemented symmetrically.) Moreover, we only show details on Step 3b of the framework, which is clear in theoretic, but ambiguous in algorithmic level. We should highlight that, our implementation of
Step 3b in ARcheck is not the only option, and readers can find an alternative easily: We aim to make AR a general framework rather than a specific algorithm.
We name Step 3b in the framework the procedure explore, whose implementation is shown in Algorithm 1. Recall that the task of explore is to either find a counterexample, or make sure S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ is true. Here explore is designed to enumerate the B-sequence from the end to the beginning (n to 0), and once finding a cube c ∈ F m ∩ R −1 (S(B)) it invokes the procedure dfscheck (Line 4), which applies trivial backward search, either to confirm a counterexample or to learn the knowledge that c can be removed from F m . If a counterexample is never returned in the IF block at Line 4, F m keeps refined (inside dfscheck ) and finally the formula ϕ becomes unsatisfiable to terminate the while loop at Line 2. Recall that we extend the F -sequence one by one, so F m is the latest extended element initialized with P , and before the extension every F k (0 ≤ k < m) must satisfy F k ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅, based on the framework. So m is the minimal index such that F m ∩ R −1 (S(B)) is not empty, which matches the requirement in the framework. Finally we use the assertion at Line 10 to guarantee S(F ) ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅ must be true at the end of Algorithm 1. The procedure dfscheck uses a depth-first strategy to search back from the input cube c to the initial states in F 0 . Starting from c, dfscheck searches its predecessors which are also in F f index . If such predecessor c 1 is found, dfscheck recursively searches the predecessor of c 1 which are also in F f index−1 (Line 10). Once a predecessor in F 0 is found, a counterexample can be returned (Line 7). Otherwise if no predecessor of c can be found in F index , c is then removed from F f index+1 (Line 14) . Note that the IF block at Line 15 is either to find a counterexample which is longer than the F -sequence, or to make c∩S(F ) empty, which is a necessary condition to keep S(F ) ∩ R −1 (B bindex ) empty. Without this
Algorithm 2 Implementation of dfscheck in ARcheck
Require: F -sequence: (F0, F1, . . . , Fm (m ≥ 0)); B-sequence: (B0, B1, . . . , Bn (n ≥ 0)); c: a cube; findex: the current index of F -sequence; bindex: the current index of B-sequence; Ensure: A counterexample is returned or S(F ) ∩ R −1 (B bindex ) = ∅ is asserted; 1: while true do 2:
if ϕ is unsatisfiable then 4: break; 5:
end if 6:
Let c1 = pa(ϕ)|x and update B bindex+1 = B bindex+1 ∪ {c1};
return unsafe with a counterexample 9:
end if 10:
if dfscheck (c1, f index − 1, bindex + 1) returns a counterexample then 11:
return unsafe with a counterexample 12:
end if 13: end while 14: Let c2 = mus(ϕ)| c , and update F f index+1 = F f index+1 ∪ {¬c2}; 15: if f index + 1 < m (Note: m is the largest index in the F -sequence) then 16:
if dfscheck (c, f index + 1, bindex) returns unsafe with a counterexample then 17:
return unsafe with a counterexample 18:
block, we can only guarantee c ∩ F j = ∅ when 0 ≤ j ≤ f index, but cannot guarantee that when f index < j ≤ m. In every invoke of dfscheck, the input f index is the minimal index such that F f index ∩ R −1 (S(B)) = ∅. The reason is, f index is initialized with the minimal index (m), and is decreased by 1 once a new bad state is found, keeping it minimal in every invoke of df scheck.
The implementation of explore here is to provide a depth-first search strategy to find new bad states to enlarge the B-sequence and refine the F -sequence. However, since the search problem has been well-studied in other areas, such as AI, better strategies may be found to replace DFS. We leave this conjecture to our future work.
Experiments
In this section, we report the results of our empirical evaluation. Our model checker ARcheck 3 combines both Forward and Backward AR in C++, while using Minisat [14] and Muser2 [19] as the SAT and MUS engines. The tool imple-ments the the partial-solution-extraction algorithm from [27] . The performance of ARcheck is tested by evaluating it on the 548 safety benchmarks from the 2015 Hardware Model Checking Competition 4 . The benchmarks (both models and properties) are provided in AIGER format 5 . We compared the performance of AR with that of IC3/PDR, as implemented in the ABC tool [5] .
We run our experiments on the DAVinCI cluster at Rice University 6 . This system consists of 2304 processor cores in 192 nodes (12 processor cores per node), running at 2.83 GHz with 48GB of RAM per node. The operating system on DAVinCI is RedHat 6.0. When we run the experiments, each tool is run on a dedicated processor core, using 8 GB of RAM. We measure CPU time, and for each instance, timeout limit was set to 1 hour. Instances that cannot be solved within this time limit are considered unsolved. We compare the modelchecking results from ARcheck with those from ABC on all benchmarks, and no discrepancy is found.
IC3/PDR F-AR B-AR AR Unsafe 72 (8) 65 (4) The data on the solved instances are shown in Table 2 , and the performance comparison between AR (forward+backward) and IC3/PDR is shown in Fig 1  ( only instances solved by both AR and IC3/PDR are plotted). For each cell m(n) in Table 2 , m is the total number of solved cases, and n is the number of cases solved only by the approach. Taking the cell 72(8) at Row 2, Column 2 as an example, IC3/PDR solves 72 unsafe instances, and among them 8 instances are solved only by IC3/PDR.
As shown in the table, Forward AR solves 10 instances that IC3/PDR cannot solve, and Backward AR solves 23 instances that IC3/PDR cannot solve. In total, AR solves 281 instances, out of which 33 are solved only by AR. In comparison, IC3/PDR solves 271 instances, out of which 23 are solved only by IC3/PDR. Fig  1 also shows AR is able to improve the performance of IC3/PDR on about 30% of the instances. We conclude therefore that AR is an important contribution to the algorithmic portfolio of SAT-based model checking.
4 http://fmv.jku.at/hwmcc15/ 5 http://fmv.jku.at/aiger/ 6 https://www.crc.rice.edu/sharecore/davinci/ Another interesting observation from the evaluation is that backward search contributes about 70% of the cases solved only by AR, especially for the Unsafe cases. Thus, running the forward and backward modes in parallel yields a significant performance enhancement. Although IC3/PDR can also be implemented to run in both directions, which may potentially improve its performance, we believe that we are the first one to present such a combination in the context of SAT-based model checking.
A careful examination of the logs of both tools reveals that when AR outperform IC3/PDR it is because it uses a much smaller number of blocking clauses to refine the F -sequence, and the same holds when IC3/PDR outperforms AR. A "good" blocking clause blocks more states than a "bad" blocking clause, speeding up the refinement of over-approximate sets. This suggests that rather than simply compute MUS (in AR) or MIC (in IC3/PDR), the goal should be to compute a "good" blocking clause. Elaborating on this observation is a promising direction for future work.
Discussion and Conclusion
Forward AR and IC3/PDR share several similarities. Both approaches keep sequences of over-approximate reachable state sets and iteratively refine these sequences, but they use different refinement techniques. A refinement step removes states that can reach bad states but are not reachable from initial states. Yet the two approaches implement the refinement step in different manners. IC3/PDR first identifies states that can reach bad states and then run a secondary reachability analysis to see if these states can be reached from initial states. In contrast, Forward AR combines a forward over-approximate reachability analysis with backward under-approximate reachability analysis. As a result, every call to the SAT solver results in some refinement: if the formula sent to the SAT solver is satisfiable, then the under-approximate sequence gets refined, while if the formula is unsatisfiable, then the over-approximate sequence gets refined. Thus, Forward AR cleanly separates safety and unsafety checking, which are tightly combined in IC3/PDR.
The different approaches of Forward AR and IC3/PDR imply other differences. IC3/PDR requires the F -sequence to be monotone. This incurs the overhead of clause propagation, but enables a fast termination test, while Forward AR requires a SAT call to check for termination. Forward AR does not require the F -sequence to be monotone, and this enables it to implement the refinement of over-approximate sets by using an off-the-shelf tool to extract MUS, while IC3/PDR has to implements its own algorithm to compute minimal inductive clauses (MIC), as the clauses returned by the SAT solver may not be inductive. Both MIC and MUS play crucial roles in the performance of IC3/PDR and AR. MIC aims first to generate inductive clauses and second to keep them as small as possible, while MUS aims only to generate clauses as small as possible. So it is often the case that a clause generated from MIC is inductive but relatively large, while the one generated from MUS is relatively small but not inductive. As a re-sult, the performance of AR can be quite different. Moreover, MIC is specialized to IC3/PDR and requires restrictions such as keeping the F -sequence monotone, as well as propagating and pushing clauses. On the other hand, MUS is a general procedure, and can be used without special requirement on the F -sequence. This makes the framework of AR easier to understand, and more flexible to extend.
In summary, we present here Approximate Reachability (AR), a new SATbased safety model checking framework. This framework differs from IC3/PDR mainly by cleanly separate safety checking and unsafety checking, and by using MUS rather than MIC to refine over-approximate state sequences. Our evaluation results show that AR is a promising algorithmic framework for SAT-based model checking. AR has some significant similarities as well as difference to IC3/PDR, which suggests that the two approaches can be combined in a single framework. For examples, heuristics used in IC3/PDR may be applicable also in AR, and features of AR, such as combining over-approximate and underapproximate sequences of reachable state sets, as well as applying the framework both forward and backward, can be applied to IC3/PDR. Furthermore, a recent improvement of IC3/PDR named Avy [24] , which combines Interpolation Model Checking (IMC) with IC3/PDR, may be easier to apply to AR, rather than to IC3/PDR, as currently Avy has to pay an additional cost of converting the generated interpolation invariants to be monotone as required by IC3/PDR.
